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THE MIRROR HAS MANY FACES:
RECOGNIZING GENDER IDENTITY IN CANADIAN
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
FRANK DURNFORD†

ABSTRACT
Owing to our failure to acknowledge the complexity and diversity of
gender identity, gender and gender politics are contentious subjects in
Canadian anti-discrimination law. On the one hand, Queer theorists
continue to challenge the rigidity of the male/female binary, while on the
other hand, Canadian law insists that identity is invariably determined
by one’s biological sex. The result is a power struggle, pitting those who
Other—the transgendered community.
Transgendered persons have encountered many barriers in their search
for equality in the law, partly owing to a lack of a proper legal foundation
on which to base their discrimination claims. This paper argues that
the failure of the already established grounds of discrimination to fully
protect and represent transgendered persons requires Canadian antidiscrimination law to incorporate gender identity as a new ground of
discrimination.

†

Frank Durnford (B.A. (Hons.), Memorial University of Newfoundland) will enter his third
year at Dalhousie Law School in September 2005.

MANY FACES . . . 201

I, your glass, will modestly discover to yourself,
that of yourself which you know not of.
— Julius Caesar, Act I, scene ii

Anti-discrimination law in Canada has proven itself to be a site of concomplexity and diversity of gender identity. While gender and Queer
theorists continue to deconstruct our social and cultural notions of gender and identity, Canadian law insists that the “discovery” of biological
sex is the construction of identity. From biological sex, the law constructs a normative identity – how we should look, act, and feel, which
in turn informs the jurisprudence of gender discrimination. Such an assumption implicitly asserts that there are but two genders, male and
female, and that the world is necessarily constructed on that premise.
However, as Gloria Anzaldúa observes, the very creation of a gendered
frontier rouses the possibility of an other.1 The gendered Other, the
transgendered, exists in law in marginalized and unprivileged spaces,
outside of and dominated by the male/female binary.
Therein lies the primary battleground of Queer theorists, who reject
the belief that gender identity is a natural event, coinciding with birth and
biological sex. Queer Theory generates a discourse wherein fundamental categories of identity, such as gender, are cultural and social productions, or in other words, performative.2 While biological sex anticipates
the normative gender role and identity of a person, these are behaviours
and actions that must be learned. To follow Michel Foucault’s illustration, the individual or the body is “the inscribed surface of events,” the
site where history and present converge and are coloured by race, class,
geography, culture, sexuality, and of course, gender.3
Yet, transgendered persons are forced to modify their own self image, often their bodies, in order to conform and be accepted into the
male/female paradigm. Self-revision is equally necessary if the trans1

Gloria Anzaldúa, “Borderlands/La Frontera” in Vincent Leitch, ed., Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (New York: Norton, 2001) 2211 at 2213.
2
Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997) at 102.
3
Judith Butler, “Gender Trouble” in Vincent Leitch, ed., Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, (New York: Norton, 2001) 2488 at 2498.
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gendered person is to succeed in seeking protection under Canada’s
anti-discrimination regime, where claims hinge on evoking enumerated
or analogous grounds of discrimination. The struggle, then, is a power
struggle in which transgendered people must resist both the imposed
gender binary and the notion that transgenderism is a disease or problem
to be remedied. Marjorie Garber proposes that “to change gender is to
slide along a power differential,” whereas “to change power is to change
gender.”4
Changing gender, then, is a necessary undertaking in order to ensure
equality of the marginalized Other. It involves recognizing the inadequacy of a number of grounds as they relate to transgenderism, keeping
in mind that grounds themselves are not ineffectual. Indeed, grounds as
a mechanism in the operation of anti-discrimination law are quite necessary. Grounds, however, must be assigned and developed cognisant of
the political power struggles anti-discrimination law hopes to balance.
Recent jurisprudence demonstrates exactly how narrow a view Canadian anti-discrimination law has adopted of gender, but also how the
transgendered Other continues to challenge our rigid conceptions of
gender and identity. To fully protect transgendered persons in the manner intended by human rights legislation and the Charter, it is crucial
gendered Other. Gender dysphoria must be embraced, not as deviant or
perverse behaviour, but as a very real and nuanced identity experience,
with not one or two, but many expressions. The failure of the already established grounds of discrimination to fully protect and represent transgendered persons requires that Canadian anti-discrimination law adopt
gender identity as a new ground.

4
Marjorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety, (New York: Routledge,
1992) as cited in Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us, (New
York: Routledge, 1994) at 97.
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I. GENDER BORDER CROSSING
“Who are YOU?” said the Caterpillar.
Alice replied, rather shyly,
“I--I hardly know, sir, just at present—
at least I know who I WAS when I got up this morning,
but I think I must have been changed several times since then.”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

The problem which many Queer theorists address is that gender dysphoria is considered abnormal, a disorder that needs to be treated, if not
cured, thereby leading Queer theorists to challenge the boundaries of not
only gender, but of normalcy itself.5 Anything which seemingly deviates
from the background norm of the male/female binary and its prescribed
gender roles and identity is deemed defective and perverse. As noted
earlier, society expects congruence between biological sex and gender,
and it expects that if there is gender dysphoria it should be corrected.
This adoption of a false reality is not supported by Queer theorists. In
her work Compulsory Heterosexuality, Adrienne Rich argues that “the
retreat into sameness – assimilation for those who can manage it, is the
most passive and debilitating of responses to political oppression, [and]
economic insecurity.”6 Such a retreat is a concession to marginalization
The background norm then, is essentially a power-based ideology
that is fundamentally linked to the gender binary. Foucault observes
unproductive, threatening, or otherwise undesirable.”7 Power is exerted
to repress so-called abnormal gender behaviour in the same way it is exginalizing such behaviour, making transgendered persons powerless.

5

Carl Stychin, “Essential Rights and Contested Identities: Sexual Orientation and Equality
Rights Jurisprudence in Canada” (1995) 8 Can. J. L. & Juris. 49 at 61.
6
Adrienne Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” in Vincent Leitch, ed.,
Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (New York: Norton, 2001) 1762 at 1763.
7
Supra note 3 at 1619.
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of an oppressive class system made all the more dangerous by the belief
that it is an entirely natural state of affairs.8
Our society’s institutions are founded upon this system, which essentially recognizes the male/female gender binary, but does not provide space for the other, the marginalized transgendered community.
Queer Theory aims to subvert this structure, to blur the lines of gender
identity by stretching gender borders. As Kate Bornstein notes, “a group
longer the same group.”9 The goal, then, as explained by cultural theorist Marjorie Garber, is the proliferation of the third, “that which questions binary thinking and introduces crisis…the “third” is a mode of
articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility.”10 In effect, the
goal is not only to avoid assimilation into the male/female paradigm, but
to deconstruct it altogether in favour of a gender that is multi-faceted,
dynamic, and most certainly realistic.
As mentioned earlier, Garber’s own argument is that “to change gender is to slide along a power differential. To change power is to change
gender.”11 Whether the transsexual who undergoes sex reassignment
surgery (SRS) or the butch lesbian who dons the garb and mannerisms
of a male, changing gender is simply further imbedding themselves in
the hierarchy, and therefore subjecting themselves to the power struggle.12 Described by Adrienne Rich as the “retreat into sameness,” such a
change in gender is merely a shift from the space of the third to actively
and tenaciously holding the central dominating discourse in place. 13 It
is not a power gain, nor does it legitimize the marginalized voices of
8

Bornstein, supra note 4 at 105.
Ibid. at 92.
10
Supra note 4 at 105.
11
Supra note 4 at 105.
12
Terri Webb, in Richard Ekins and Dave King, eds., Blending Genders: Social Aspects of
Cross-dressing and Sex-changing, (NewYork: Routledge, 1996) at 193, expresses the belief that
all male transsexuals do violence to women and themselves in their need to adopt a women’s
tions; an act which is not dissimilar to a “healthy” heterosexual male’s desire to own women in
a possessive and misogynist sense. Likewise, as female transsexuals or transgendered lesbians
try to assimilate maleness, they try to assimilate power, recognizing the lack of power possessed
by their female bodies.
13
Rich, supra note 6 at 1763.
9
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ing change, the adoption of one gender is the proliferation of the many
silences at the periphery of accepted human behaviour. The solution
Sandra LaFramboise suggest that “our culture should re-invent itself
as a rainbow to incorporate transgender, instead of a black and white
dichotomy.”14 Similarly, Bornstein emphasises that “there is no gender
ders at that.”15 To that end, the power imbalance can only be corrected
when our notions of gender are broadened, recognizing that congruency
is not the ‘natural’ norm. We must depart from our boxes, stray from
linear thinking, and insist our cultural institutions see gender not as the
one-dimensional result of biology, but as the ongoing result of the relationship between biology, history, and culture.

II. CRITICAL MANEUVERING
“If homosexuality is a disease,
then we should all call in queer to work.
“Hello? Work? Yeah, can’t come in today…
yeah, still queer.”
— Robyn Tyler, activist [emphasis added]

the questions stand: how does the gender power struggle play out in
law, what questions does it raise as to the legitimacy of the law, and,
more importantly, can the law begin to embark on the path of responding to Queer Theory? The answers to these questions are closely linked
with the position of the Canadian legal community in the essentialist/
constructionist dialogue and will inevitably require a change in our approach to Charter16 and human rights law, such that “gender identity” be
established as a ground of discrimination.
14

Project” in Law Reform Project (Vancouver: High Risk Project Society, 1996) at 15.
15
Supra note 8 at 115.
16
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c.C-12 [Charter].
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knowledge another dialogue which is part of the larger, contemporary
discussion of grounds. In Egan v. Canada, the dissenting judgment of
Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé attempts to revisit the “fundamental
purpose of section 15 of the Charter” in a manner that places a great
deal of emphasis on the protection of, and respect for, basic human dignity.17
crimination should focus on “impact (i.e. discriminatory effect) rather
than on constituent elements (i.e. the grounds of the distinction) and
that the former must be considered with respect to the perspective of the
victim.18 While the judgment of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Egan does eventually help shape the discussion of step three of the section 15 analysis
in Law, parts of the judgment have nonetheless met with criticism.
In particular, the suggestion is made by L’Heureux-Dubé J. that:
…the effect of the ‘enumerated or analogous grounds’ approach
may be to narrow the ambit of section 15, and to encourage too
much analysis at the wrong level…By looking at the grounds for the
distinction instead of at the impact of the distinction on particular
groups, we risk understanding an analysis that is distanced and
desensitized from real people’s real experiences.19

Arguably, then, L’Heureux-Dubé J. is suggesting an approach that is
more liberal in its scope, focusing on the autonomous individual, her
sense of human dignity, and her right to not have that infringed. Such an
approach could plausibly generate a shift away from grounds, the basis
of discrimination, to a discussion that focuses on simply the effects, or
the aftermath of discrimination. Dianne Pothier argues that this actually
detracts from the goals of anti-discrimination law and that we should be
and complicated nature of grounds.”20
As Pothier rightfully notes, “grounds of discrimination are not a

17

Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 542 (SCC) [Egan].
Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (SCC) [Law].
19
Supra note 17 at 545 [emphasis in original].
20
Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences.”
(2001)13 Can. J. W. & L. 38 at 39.
18
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which the law has, belatedly, given recognition.”21 Grounds are essential to anti-discrimination law, as it operates at the moment. A ground
of discrimination, from its conception to its implementation, (ideally)
becomes a space in which the struggles of marginalized communities
and discourses may be articulated in a legal context. That there is a
ground such as sex is indicative of the real people who are subject to a
real power struggle and who experience real discrimination. The existence of that particular struggle is acknowledged and understood in law
through that particular ground. Sherene Razack suggests in her book
Looking White People in the Eye that “without an understanding of how
responses to subordinate groups are socially organized to sustain existing power arrangements, we cannot hope either to communicate across
social hierarchies or to work to eliminate them.”22 It is equally important
tion. Rather, grounds should be maintained through constant vigilance,
countering shifts in political power relationships that are manipulated
by history, culture, and social change.
If we are to gain anything from Butler’s notion of performative gender, it is necessary to understand that gender is not historically and geoand geographically contingent.23 One of the fundamental criticisms of
the male/female gender binary is that gender is so much more; it is multi-vocal, multilingual, and multi-faceted. Attempts at inclusion mean
not work because they operate within the traditional categorical modes
tion. Lise Gotell warns it is necessary for the judiciary to avoid such
traps. In “Queering Law: Not by Vriend,” Gotell insists that, “in order
to destabilize the neat divide between straight inside and queer outside,
there is a pressing need to resist the strategic attractions of sexual identity politics.”24 Accordingly, and for other reasons, arguing human rights
or section 15 Charter claims where a transgendered person is alleg21

Ibid. at 41.
Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1998) at 11.
23
Vincent Leitch et al., “Michel Foucault: Introduction” Vincent Leitch, ed., Norton Anthology
of Theory and Criticism (New York: Norton, 2001) 1615 at 1618.
24
Lise Gotell, “Queering Law: Not by Vriend” (2002) 17 Can. J. L. & Soc’y 89 at 93.
22

208 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

edly discriminated under the purview of the enumerated or analogous
grounds of sexual orientation, sex, or disability does not work.
1. Sexual Orientation
Sexual orientation is simply an inadequate and improper ground upon
which a transgendered person might advance a discrimination complaint. Quite frankly, the two are barely, if at all, related. However, it
is a common misconception of our society that the two are linked.25
Bornstein notes that “those who practice non-traditional sex are seen
by members of the dominant culture as a whole with those who don
non-traditional gender roles and identities.”26 Despite our willingness
to group that which does not conform to societal norms into an(other)
category, we cannot deny that “there are straight transgendered people,
gay transgendered people, and bisexual transgendered people” and that
sexuality orientation is not contingent on one’s sex, either biological or
self-perceived.27
In the American case Underwood v. Archer Management Services,
a complaint brought forward by a transsexual person on the ground of
sexual orientation was actually dismissed because it was devoid of any
claim of discriminatory conduct based on the plaintiff’s real or perceived preference or practice of sexuality. 28 The Court was correct to
differentiate between the sex to which we are attracted and the sex, or
lack thereof, with which we associate. Transgenderism and sexual orientation, then, are two quite different and independent aspects of one’s
self.

25

Minnesota Statutes 1992, section 363.01 subd. 23 and 45 read: “Sexual orientation” means…
having, or being perceived as a having an orientation for such attachment, or having or being
perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological
maleness or femaleness.”
26
Supra note 4 at 38.
27
upra note 14 at 27.
28
857 F Supp 96 [D DC 1994].
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2. Sex
Unfortunately, Canadian jurisprudence has generally failed to embrace
Butler’s understanding of gender and has, instead, adopted a notion of
gender that is primarily essentialist, immutable, and inherently linked to
sex. The Federal Court of Appeal, stated in Thibaudeau v. R. that, “sex
29
The case was
a section 15(1) Charter claim challenging a provision of the Income Tax
Act.30 In obiter, Hugessen J. went on to say that, “[t]here are only two
sexes. One excludes the other. A male is always the opposite of a female
and vice versa.” Likewise, in a footnote, Hugessen J. does not deny that
“homosexuals or transsexuals [may] constitute a third or even a fourth
sex,” and that such a decision “would necessarily do so on the basis that
each of the sexual categories so found was exclusive of all others.”31
Other than the fact that homosexuality or heterosexuality has little to do with sex, there are other problems with these statements. The
creation of a third or a fourth sex would merely create a paradigm that
the gender hierarchy. Females and the transgendered other would still
be subject to the dominating patriarchal discourse because of efforts
at avoiding exclusionary practices. Furthermore, the two marginalized
groups would be, and indeed are, forced to compete for space and voice.
Most recently, this has been demonstrated in the case Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society.32
Kimberly Nixon is a male to female transsexual who claimed that
Vancouver Rape Relief Society (hereinafter Rape Relief) denied her
both a service and employment in violation of sections 8 and 13 of the
British Columbia Human Rights Code33 on the basis of sex. Nixon was
successful in her challenge at the tribunal, but that decision was later
set aside at trial. Essentially, Nixon as a transgendered person who had
gone through sex reassignment surgery (SRS) was denied the right to
work as a peer counsellor at Rape Relief on the basis that she had not
29

Thibaudeau v. R., [1994] 114 D.L.R. (4th) 261 at para. 23, 21 C.R.R. (2d) 35 (FCA), rev’d on
other grounds [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (SCC) [Thibaudeau].
30
R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1.
31
Thibaudeau, supra note 29.
32
(2003), 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 254.
33
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C., c. 210 (the “Code”).
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fully lived her life as a woman. “A woman,” Nixon was informed by
Rape Relief, “had to be oppressed since birth to be a volunteer at Rape
group.34
As such, when Rape Relief concedes that, “sex is not a binary concept
but a continuum” it is recognizing the complexity of physical changes
that many transgendered persons may experience but it is not advocating an advantageous concept of gender.35 While creating a space for
merely to further complicate the hierarchy such that individuals will be
considered “more of a woman” or “not woman enough.” Marginalizaable group (woman since birth, woman post-SRS, cross-dressing men).
Gender role and gender identity provide a background narrative that
has little consequence in an assessment that is still grounded in sex and
sexual identity politics.
In accepting Rape Relief’s arguments, the British Columbia Supreme
Court also revisited the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v.
Powley
36
Particularly, the Court discusses the third part of the
test in Powley, which provides that “the core of community acceptance
is past and ongoing participation in a shared culture, in the customs
and traditions…[that] distinguish it from other groups.”37 Edwards J.
observes, “If the Powley

girls and women…certainly on the community acceptance criterion.”38
In this circumstance, the Powley test plays into the essentialist notion
of gender, and therefore challenges the legitimacy of not only Nixon’s
womanhood, but of her gender identity, by contemplating what Nixon
is as opposed to who she is. In so doing, Nixon as a transgendered per-

34

Supra note 32 at 261.
Supra note 32 at 271.
36
(2003), 230 D.L.R. (4th) [Powley].
37
Ibid. at para. 33.
38
Supra note 32 at 274.
35

MANY FACES . . . 211

group. Nixon is subjected to a political power struggle whereby Rape
Relief’s efforts to empower women are deemed incompatible with, and
even superior to, the rights of an individual that is ‘less’ than a woman.
Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief is not the only Canadian case in
recent history to grapple with issue of incorporating transgenderism under the enumerated ground of sex. In Sheridan v. Sanctuary Investments
Ltd. (No. 3), a pre-operative transsexual woman, Tawni Sheridan, was
refused use of the women’s washroom in a bar despite having a letter
from the gender clinic which was treating her saying that she was required to live full-time as a woman for two years as a condition of her
sex reassignment surgery.39 Tribunal Member Humphreys ultimately
found that there was discrimination and that Sheridan was entitled to
use the women’s washroom. In delivering the decision, the Tribunal acknowledged that “the law…assumes that sex is a bipolar characteristic
and that an individual is either male or female” but that “given the large
and liberal interpretation which the Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized must be applied to human rights legislation…discrimination
against a transsexual constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.”40
Similarly, in New York Supreme Court case Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry Ltd., Lehner JSC. rules that transsexualism will fall under sex
as a prohibited ground of discrimination because “although…a person
may have both male and female characteristics, society only recognizes
two sexes” such that a transsexual may be a “sub-group” of either men
or women, accordingly.41
The United Kingdom’s jurisprudence walks the same path as a the
Canadian and American courts. In P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, where a town manager is to be dismissed for having undergone SRS,
“the United Kingdom and the Commission submit that to dismiss a person because he or she is a transsexual or because he or she has undergone
a gender-reassignment operation does not constitute sex discrimination
for the purposes of the directive.”42 The Court of Justice of the European
39

(1999), 33 C.H.R.R. D/467, [1999] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 43 (QL) (B.C. Trib.) [Sheridan cited
to C.H.R.R.].
40
Ibid. at paras. 91 and 93. This reasoning was later adopted by the British Columbia Human
Rights Tribunal in Mamela v. Vancouver Lesbian Connection (1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/318 (B.C.
Trib).
41
626 N.Y.S. 2d 391, 1995 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 115, at 556.
42
[1996] NLOR No. 3408 at para. 14.
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Communities ultimately rejected the argument, ruling it contrary to the
dignity and freedom of a person to discriminate a person because she
falls outside of the man/woman dichotomy.
In keeping with the trends in Canadian and International jurisprudence, the Ontario Human Rights Council (OHRC) adopted a Policy on
Discrimination and Harassment because of Gender Identity that supports “a progressive understanding of the ground ‘sex’ to include ‘gender identity.’”43 The OHRC Policy is correct and clear in differentiating
gender identity from sexual orientation but in its “purposive and liberal
interpretation of the ground of sex,” the OHRC Policy demonstrates its
lack of appreciation for the political power struggle that underlies the
enumerated ground of sex.44 The Ontario Human Rights Commission is
not, or is choosing not to be, cognisant of the inherent restrictions of the
sion says in its policy that it is committed to “promoting the dignity and
equality of those whose gender does not conform to traditional social
norms.”45 Already it is quite clear that transgendered persons are merely
being regulated into a category not because they identify with it, but because they do not. The language suggests that transgendered people are
being protected because they are different and that there is a dominant
social identity against which they are being compared.
Like the aforementioned case law, the Ontario Human Rights Commission bases its anti-discrimination efforts on methods of categorization that make assignments of similarity and difference. Nitya Iyer
observes that “legal categories tend to assign two sorts of difference:
difference as distinction and difference as hierarchy.”46 The former indicates difference as “an expression of a relationship,” that difference
cannot exist in isolation.47 A person is tall because there is someone who
is short. I am male by virtue of the fact that I am not that which my sister is: female. Such distinctions allow us to form the categories which
43
Ontario, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Discrimination and Harassment because of Gender Identity (Toronto: OHRC, 2001) at 1.
44
Ibid. at 4.
45
Ibid. at 2 [emphasis added].
46
Nita Iyer, “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity” (1993)
19 Queen’s L.J. 179 at 183.
47
Ibid. at 185.
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are the driving mechanisms of anti-discrimination law, but that are also
the basis of difference as hierarchy. These categories inevitably express
hierarchal relationships and assertions of power.48 In the case of sex,
the dominant sexual identity is embedded in the basic social structure
male. ‘Male’ retains power by having ‘female’ as a basis of distinction,
as a second link in a hierarchal structure. The incorporation of the third,
of the transgendered, does not detract from that power as it gains space
in the gender binary only as an exception. “In the contemporary legal
comes a means by which groups who depart from the silent…norm are
reduced to a characteristic that both contains and constitutes them.”49
By creating an exception that exists both inside and outside of the gendered hierarchy, the governing discourse has established a stable minority that requires its protection that needs advocacy, and compassion.
Consequently, whether at the hands of legislatures, administrative decision makers, or the judiciary, the power struggle is won in the guise of
protecting the position of the status quo, and it is in this way that the
dominant social identities are able to resist change.
3. Disability
That a complaint of discrimination against a transgendered person
would be grounded in the ground of disability is a testament to early
and contemporary notions of transgenderism as a disease or disorder.
Gender Identity Disorder (GID), also termed gender dysphoria, is listed
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMIV), published by the American Psychiatric Association (302.6 and
302.85).50 Gender experts have also devised a set of guidelines called
The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association’s
Standards of Care For Gender Identity Disorder. This universal consensus gives medical professionals a set of guidelines by which they
48

Ibid. at 185.
Supra note 24 at 108.
50
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) [DSM-IV]. Homosexuality had been removed from the publication in 1973, but it has since been restored with respect to those who suffer with their homosexuality in a homophobic society.
49
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may manage patients seeking hormones and surgery.51 Unfortunately,
transgendered people are also impaired by the treatment they receive in
society, through social alienation and a denial of access to social programs.52
is affected to some degree by gender dysphoria and any related psychological complications, “their lifelong condition can be recognized as a
medical condition, a condition that can be diagnosed and potentially
treated through medical intervention.”53 To that end, it seems that all
in human rights legislation.
Synthia Kavanagh, a male to female transsexual, was successful in
her discrimination claim on the grounds of both sex and disability in the
case Kavanagh v. Canada (AG). 54 Kavanagh, who had been living as a
woman, was convicted of second degree murder and was consequently
incarcerated in a male federal prison, despite the recommendation of the
judge that she be placed in a female prison. Kavanagh claimed that, as a
transgendered person, she was denied both her regular hormonal treatment and her sex reassignment surgery, for which she was preparing.
Furthermore, she argued her dignity and freedoms were being infringed
by being placed in a male prison. Ms. Kavanagh was successful in all
her complaints, on both the grounds of sex and disability.55
Likewise, Leslie Ferris, a transgendered person, was successful in
her complaint of discrimination on the basis of “sex and/or disability”
for being denied access to the women’s washroom at her workplace.56
Tribunal Member Iyer observed that both sex and disability were reasonable grounds upon which to base a discrimination claim. The judgdiscrimination because of transgendered status as discrimination on the
51

52

In Kavanagh v. Canada (AG) (2000), 41 C.H.R.R. D/119 [Kavanagh], the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal describes the tremendous torment, including the social ostracism, suffered by
individuals who perceive their bodies as incongruent with their subjective sense of who they
really are.
53
Supra note 14 at 25.
54
Supra note 50.
55
Supra note 50 at paras. 5-9.
56
(1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/329 at para.
1 (BC HRT).
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it as discrimination on the basis of sex.”57 Despite the reassurances of
the Tribunal, it seems likely that there is a greater issue at large that
would make disability an undesirable ground upon which a transgendered person might pursue a discrimination claim. That there is even the
suggestion of a hierarchy among grounds requires further investigation
into disability.
The case law indicates that disability is a mirror with many faces.
That is, disability is not only determined by a person’s self-perception,
framboise note that, “To constitute a disability, a condition does not
have to “inherently impair” the individual…It is the discrimination on
the basis of the function which brings it under the disability umbrella
rather than a necessary impairment of function.”58 Furthermore, a person need not actually be disabled if she is perceived to be disabled and
is discriminated on that basis.59
There are a number of points to consider here. Certainly, for the
individual, the opportunity to succeed in the assertion of a particular
complaint on the ground of disability is, admittedly, quite appealing. It
the extent that your disorder is no longer your fault. For a transgendered
person to succeed on a claim of disability acknowledges transgenderism as a disorder that is beyond the control of the claimant, but that is
very real. Success at the tribunal level or in the courts would solidify the
disorder. Other victories would follow, possibly lending credibility to
doors to other disabled communities, resources, and funding.60
However, the victory is perhaps a little short-sighted. Ultimately, it is
necessary to consider the political and power-based effects of transgenderism as a disability. Disability is generally not perceived as positive.
Indeed, that is the very reason why it is labelled as a ground needing
57
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cation, restriction, or disadvantage.”61
that transgenderism is, at its origins, a problem, thereby alleviating the
pressure on society to change its views, to reshape the dominant discourse. If effect, as self-proclaimed disabled persons, transgendered
people who pursue discrimination claims on the grounds of disability
position themselves at the lower end of the political hierarchy.
As with the ground of sex, any discrimination claim based on disability must contend with a rigid and power-driven hierarchy. Richard
Devlin and Dianne Pothier observe that “historically, we have tended to
adopt a binary conception of disability: there are the disabled and the
able-bodied.”62 Similar to the male/female gender binary, the binary approach to disability generates a philosophy of I am that I am that you are
not, which is akin to Iyer’s description of “difference as distinction.”63
who are disabled, who “need” protection, and who are inevitably denied
space and voice. To that end, “difference as hierarchy” is engaged such
that the power rests with the able-bodied majority while the disabled are
powerless and marginalized.64 The able-bodied majority are left to determine “the performance benchmarks we utilize to assess people” and
continue with “its oppressive characterization of an impairment.”65
Transgendered as disabled in anti-discrimination law simply offers
more problems than its potential successes are worth. As a course of
action “it is inconsistent with a political strategy that demands society
change its idea of normal and healthy and non-disabled to include transgendered people, rather than to continue to treat them as aberrations,
which in turn reinforces the mistreatment they receive.”66 As a ground
of discrimination, it actually robs transgendered people of autonomy.
Politically, legally, and socially, the situation is complicated not only
by the complexity of a myriad of perceived gender identities, but of the
61
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male/female gender binary because of a disability.

III. OPEN GROUND
“What’s convenient for the government
is that they keep this scapegoat called the queer voice.
Silence does equal death – and we are being silenced.”
— Lori E. Seid, Producer Taboo [emphasis added]

Having established that grounds are necessary and core to anti-discrimination law, and that neither sexual orientation, nor sex, nor disability are
adequate or appropriate grounds on which transgendered persons should
advance discrimination complaints, it remains to proffer a ground which
may prove adequate. Indeed, the establishment of gender identity as an
for transgendered people to pursue discrimination claims, and a space
which is void of inherent hierarchies.
There is no doubt that transgendered people, those who experience
all levels of gender dysphoria, need a discursive space of their own
within the framework of Canadian anti-discrimination laws. Dianne
Pothier insists, “the conception of the ground has to be apparent.”67 Accordingly, it is necessary that the ground be established to explicitly protect all persons who experience gender dysphoria, whether transsexual
or transvestite, gender blender or gender bender. Moreover, the ground
of gender identity must be determined by the interests of those it is
mind, constructing a transgendered space necessarily requires a lack of
borders and responsiveness to a person’s self-perceived gender identity,
and not their apparent sex. Transgendered persons should not be forced
politically devised construct.
By virtue of its design, the ground of gender identity as a space
for transgendered persons within landscape of anti-discrimination law
should be void of inherent hierarchies. The creation of the space decon67
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structs both difference as distinction and difference as hierarchy faced
within the boundaries of both sex and disability. The comparisons and
the rigid constructions will still exist in those grounds. However, the
establishment of gender identity as a ground relocates transgendered
people on a parallel plane, affording them rights protection on their own
terms.
Kate Bornstein says that “the correct target for any transsexual rebellion would be the gender system itself. But transsexuals won’t attack
that system until they themselves are free of the need to participate in
it.”68
direction, toward a rebellion located in anti-discrimination law, fought
on the principles of equality.
There is room in human rights legislation to change the gender system, to help not only cure but prevent the discrimination of transgendered people. For example, the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act states in
section 24(1)(b), “The Commission shall develop a program of public
principle that every person is free and equal in dignity and rights…”69
That particular section, and sections 24(1)(c-f) would provide many
other opportunities for the promulgation of transgender issues and the
balancing of the gender power struggle. Legal institutions have an opportunity to engage in a dialogue geared toward understanding and acceptance, synthesizing the theoretical, medical, cultural and historical.
Furthermore, human rights commissions have a statute-based obligation
to move beyond dialogue to effect change.

IV. CONCLUSION
Alice laughed: “There’s no use trying,” she said; “one can’t believe
impossible things.” “I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said
the Queen. “When I was younger, I always did it for half an hour a
day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things
before breakfast.”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
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ing when we change gender? Kate Bornstein writes, “As I looked at

needed to be abandoned in search of a deeper meaning.”70 The history
of gender is indicative of its multifarious manifestations throughout culture and geography and its importance to social and political issues of
anti-discrimination law.
Transgender is not the invention of a politically contentious and increasingly complicated society. Transgender is not a protest mechanism,
nor a fashionable social deviance. Rather, its very origins are within our
social constructions of gender and society’s construction of the subject.
From the moment our biological sex is proclaimed, we become a site of
construction, shaped by the relationships inherent to a politically charged
power struggle over gender-based discursive space. In real practice, this
entails the marginalization of the gender other, the transgender community, and often competition between marginal groups, such as women
and homosexuals, in favour of a dominant heterosexual patriarchy.
While Queer Theory attempts to subvert this rigid practice of marginalization and oppression, it can only succeed insofar as its narrative
is adopted by the power-based structures of our society. Shauna Labman argues that “the law has the ability to both mirror and construct
social norms.”71 The recent case law, law reform reports, and legal commentary would suggest that the rights of transgender persons are being
recognized within the operation of anti-discrimination law. However,
to a discourse which does not appreciate the transgender perception of
self. Instead, the current legal discourse is based upon a philosophy of
transgender persons. As such, the legal discourse, while generally exhibiting good intentions, is limiting the ground upon which transgender
rights can be fully recognized outside of existing political power struggles inherent to both sex and disability.
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By adopting a Queer Theory approach to gender identity, and by
establishing gender identity as a protected ground of discrimination,
steps in deconstructing the rigidity of gender. Effectively, the creation of
space for transgender through gender identity would change the balance
of power by placing identity in the hands of the transgender community.
Fluid, dynamic, and realistic, the self-described notions of gender identity would empower the marginalized discourse. To change power, of
course, is to change gender.

